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 Abstract:  This article tests the effect of accountability on negotiation outcomes in a face-to-face classroom experiment. 
Student participants were asked to form coalitions in groups of three. In the treatment condition, negotiators were 
held accountable by a personal forum during the formation of the coalition. In the control condition, negotiators were 
not held accountable. Results show that accountability leads to lower group performance in coalition negotiations. 
Accountability also reduced the willingness of negotiators to include all negotiators in a “grand coalition.” Rather, 
accountable negotiators reached agreement with a subset of negotiators. Accountability increased the odds of reaching 
no agreement. These findings challenge the idea of increased performance as a result of public accountability in the 
context of coalition negotiations. 
 Evidence for Practice 
•  Accountable negotiators are less likely to form coalitions that include all negotiators—a so-called grand 
coalition—because negotiators focus on their individual results. 
•  Accountable negotiators show lower group performance in negotiations. 
•  The consequences of accountability—such as sanctions—have little impact on the performance of 
negotiators when negotiations are repeated. 
 Negotiation is one of the most common activities of all employees (Lægreid  2000 ; Susskind and Ozawa  1983 ). Negotiations 
focus, for example, on buying and selling goods 
or on problem solving. In the public sector, 
negotiations involve the coordination of inter- and 
intradepartmental tasks, the acquisition of goods 
and services, and the allocation of budgets (Dijkstra, 
Van Assen, and Stokman 2008). An example is the 
implementation of health care policies, which includes 
many stakeholders. During the implementation of 
these policies, representatives of patients’ federations, 
hospitals, and government have to negotiate practical 
implementation (see O’Toole  2000 ). 
 Although the outcomes of negotiations by public 
servants can have great societal impacts, negotiation 
as a research topic has not gained much attention 
from public administration scholars. Some exceptions 
are work on public-private partnerships (Medda 
 2007 ), decision making in policy implementation 
(Torenvlied and Akkerman  2004 ), and labor relations 
and collective bargaining (Perry and Angle  1979 ; 
Riccucci  2011 ). As public organizations contribute to 
the public good by definition, individual negotiation 
outcomes by civil servants are often public outcomes 
as well. 
 Public accountability is consistently rated as the 
most important public value by civil servants 
(Van der Wal, de Graaf, and Lasthuizen 2008). 
Recent developments in Western democracies 
have only bolstered accountability measures by 
public organizations (Bovens, Schillemans, and 
’t Hart 2008, 225). However, competing claims 
have been made about the effects of accountability. 
Accountability is often viewed as an instrument to 
prevent corruption of those in power. It is seen as 
instrument to increase perceived trustworthiness, 
enhance integrity, and increase performance 
(Bovens, Schillemans, and ’t Hart 2008). The 
problem of who exactly is to blame is a well-known 
difficulty of accountability (Thompson  2005 ). 
Accountability may lead to window-dressing (de 
Wolf and Janssens 2007) or to task overload for 
public servants. 
 While accountability is known to have an impact 
on the thoughts, feelings, and actions of individuals 
(Lerner and Tetlock  1999 ), public administration 
scholars have neglected its potential effects on 
specific activities of public servants, such as 
negotiation. Social psychologists have established 
that individual negotiators are more “contentious” 
when they expect to be held accountable (Ben-Yoav 
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and Pruitt  1984 ). Negotiators care for the equality of outcomes 
when the accountability between negotiators is high (Kramer, 
Pommerenke, and Newton  1993 ). When teams of negotiators are 
held accountable, the responsibility of the negotiated outcome is 
distributed among the team members (O’Connor  1997 ). 
 Still, individuals respond competitively to accountability 
mechanisms, leading to lower individual outcomes in 
negotiations (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt  1984 ). Thus, the effects of 
accountability on negotiator behavior and outcomes have been 
investigated in a limited number of studies, while the effect of 
accountability on negotiating a coalition by public servants has 
been neglected thus far. 
 Coalitions as a negotiation outcome are omnipresent in public 
policy networks (Provan and Milward 2001) and public-private 
partnerships (see Skelcher  2005 ), among other settings, which 
reinforces the need for knowledge on this topic. 
 In this study, we aim to fill this gap. We ask,  does public 
accountability lead to different coalitions and lower negotiator 
performance in coalition negotiations? 
 We employed a face-to-face classroom experiment that enabled us 
to test the causal effect of accountability on negotiation outcomes 
by public servants. In negotiation research, experiments are often 
used to establish causal relations. Both laboratory and classroom 
experiments have been used in a range of negotiation studies 
(e.g., Embrey, Fréchette, and Lehrer  2014 ; Sinaceur et al. 2013). 
Within public administration, the share of experimental work 
is still relatively small (Groeneveld et al. 2015). Experimental 
designs are increasingly seen as a rigorous method for testing 
and developing theory (Anderson and Edwards  2015 ; Margetts 
 2011 ; Perry  2012 ). Accountability scholars have suggested 
that experimental research could help answer fundamental 
accountability questions by disentangling causes and effects (Koch 
and Wüstemann  2014 ). 
 Theory and Hypotheses 
 In this section, we first discuss negotiations, accountability in the 
public domain, and coalitions. Next, we combine these streams 
of literature to arrive at a set of five hypotheses to be tested in our 
experiment. 
 Negotiations 
 Negotiation is “the process of back-and-forth communication aimed 
at reaching agreement with others when some of your interests are 
shared and some are opposed” (Ury  1993 , 4). Examples of public 
sector negotiations are negotiations in public-private partnerships 
(Klijn, Koppenjan, and Termeer  1995 ), allocation of scarce 
resources within organizations, and negotiations with autonomous 
bodies—so-called public service bargains (Hood and Lodge  2006 ). 
 Negotiation situations share a number of characteristics (Lewicki, 
Saunders, and Barry  2015 ). Negotiations have two or more actors 
that have a conflict of needs or desires. Actors negotiate by choice, 
and a give-and-take process can be expected. Actors prefer to 
negotiate and search for alternatives rather than struggle or fight 
publicly. Negotiation involves the management of tangibles (prices 
or terms) and intangibles (such as the need to win or avoid losses 
and the need to obtain or keep a good reputation). The outcomes of 
negotiations are influenced by the interdependence of parties’ goals 
(Lewicki, Saunders, and Barry  2015 ). 
 Two types of negotiations are often distinguished. Distributive 
bargaining refers to negotiations in which the achievement of 
one party’s goals blocks the other’s goals (Pruitt et al. 1978). 
Distributive negotiations are also known as constant- or zero-
sum games in game theory (see Scharpf  1994 ). The second type 
is known as integrative negotiation, in which all parties achieve 
gains or solve a common problem (Lewicki, Saunders, and Barry 
 2015 ). These are known as variable- or non-zero-sum games in 
game theory (see Morrow  1994 ; Osborne and Rubinstein  1994 ; 
Peleg and Sudhölter  2007 ; Schelling  1980 ). Negotiations carried 
out by public servants may be constant sum (e.g., the acquisition of 
goods and services) or variable sum (seeking a solution to a policy 
problem together with other policy actors). In this study, we focus 
on variable-sum negotiations. 
 Accountability in the Public Sector 
 We define accountability in the public sector as “a relationship 
between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation 
to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose 
questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences” 
(Bovens  2007 , 107). 
 Because public servants operate on behalf of citizens or civil society 
based on politically defined mandates, public organizations are 
held publicly responsible for the outcomes they produce. This 
responsibility is determined by accountability through various 
oversight mechanisms (Bovens, Goodin, and Schillemans  2014 ). 
Accountability is seen as a mechanism of democratic control 
that is claimed to increase performance, enhance integrity of 
public governance, and render perceptions of trustworthiness and 
transparency with citizens. 
 Central to the definition used in this study is that there are four 
distinctive elements (Bovens  2007 , 107). An actor and a forum 
are in a relationship. Within this relationship, the actor has an 
obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct. Afterward, the 
forum can pose questions and pass judgment. Finally, the actor 
may face consequences. These consequences come in the form of 
sanctions or rewards. 
 In many public organizations, the relationship between the actor 
and forum is legally binding. Therefore, it is the expectation 
of being held accountable (shadow of the future) or facing the 
consequences of performance that will alter the behavior of 
negotiators (O’Connor  1997 ). 
 Coalitions 
 This study focuses on coalitions as an outcome of negotiations. 
Coalitions are “a collection of parties within a larger social setting who 
work together to pursue mutually desirable goals” (Lewicki, Saunders, 
and Barry  2015 , 385; Guo and Lim  2007 , 1122). 
 Coalitions have a number of characteristics. They are interacting 
groups of individuals. Coalitions are deliberately constructed and 
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issue oriented. They exist independently of a formal structure, 
meaning that coalitions are not a formal group such as an 
organization or team that is created by design. Coalitions also lack 
a formal structure such as internal hierarchy, while leadership roles 
may form in existing coalitions. They focus on goals external to the 
coalition. Coalitions require concerted member action (Lewicki, 
Saunders, and Barry  2015 ; Stevenson, Pearce, and Porter  1985 ). 
Central in formed and pending coalitions is that the actors involved 
care about the outcomes (O’Connor  1997 , 386). Coalition forming 
demands that negotiators balance individual needs and desires 
against group needs and desires. 
 Accountability and Negotiations 
 O’Connor ( 1997 ) found that negotiators paired in teams who 
are held accountable behaved more dominantly or competitively. 
Accountable negotiators made fewer concessions and employed 
more contentious strategies than their nonaccountable counterparts 
(Klimoski  1972 ). Compared with nonaccountable negotiators, 
this could lead to higher individual gains and lower group gains on 
average (Pruitt et al. 1978). 
 If mechanisms of accountability indeed lead to competitive rather 
than cooperative or problem-solving behavior, the difficulty of 
reaching an agreement will increase, especially in coalitions that 
aim to solve issues by negotiating. Accountability will lead to more 
competitive behavior during negotiations because negotiators 
will feel the social need to perform better for their “forum” (see 
O’Connor  1997 ), or they may fear the consequences of bad 
performance (Bovens  2007 ).
 Hypothesis 1:  Accountable negotiators will show lower 
performance at the group level than nonaccountable 
negotiators. 
 As accountability leads to more competitive behavior by individual 
negotiators (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt  1984 ; Mosterd and Rutte  2000 ; 
O’Connor  1997 ), we expect this mechanism to lead to lower group 
scores as soon as all negotiators are exposed to accountability. As a 
result, negotiators will form coalitions that do not incorporate all 
negotiators but rather a subset of the group. 
 By reaching an agreement that includes all negotiators that are 
present—a “grand coalition”—negotiators show that they care more 
about group outcomes than individual outcomes. This is partly in 
line with what others have found; negotiators care about individual 
as well as group outcomes at the same time (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt 
 1984 ). However, under pressure of accountability, negotiators must 
choose between individual and group payoffs.
 Hypothesis 2:  The presence of an accountability forum 
during negotiations will lead to fewer grand coalitions. 
 The increased efforts of players to reach an agreement but also to 
maximize payoffs at the group and individual levels make reaching 
an agreement that satisfies all negotiators more difficult. We expect 
that the number of defaults (no deal) will increase as a result of 
accountability, even in coalition negotiations (see Mosterd and 
Rutte  2000 ). When time is limited, negotiators are also forced to 
reach an agreement. Not reaching an agreement has no payoff. 
 In the public domain, there are often limited alternatives for 
certain (policy) coalitions, which forces negotiators to cooperate. 
Further, as the number of people and thus interests expand vastly 
when negotiators are being held accountable, the “computational 
difficulty” of many viewpoints in the negotiation setting drives 
negotiators to opt for a solution that will yield more points at the 
individual level. Therefore, reaching a coalition—regardless of size 
and shape—is more attractive than defaulting. Because negotiators 
care about the group outcome (hypothesis  2 ) but also compete as a 
result of accountability (hypothesis  1 ), the frequency of defaults will 
increase.
 Hypothesis 3:  Holding negotiators accountable will lead 
to a higher chance of default (no deal) compared with 
nonaccountable negotiators. 
 We expect that the  consequences (sanctions or rewards) of 
accountability will have effects on negotiator behavior. The 
consequences define the relation between the forum and the 
negotiator. Public budgets are prioritized, but rewards for good 
performance are not so common in the public domain (Verhoest 
et al. 2010, 143). Sanctioning poor performance is a more common 
practice. From this perspective, negotiators who are sanctioned are 
“poor performers.”
 Hypothesis 4:  Lower individual negotiation outcomes will 
lead to a higher frequency of sanctions by an accountability 
forum. 
 We also expect that there is a link between the number of defaults 
(no deal) as a coalition outcome and the chances of a sanction. 
Poor negotiators will fail to order their preferences (especially given 
the presence of a forum) and therefore will also fail to reach an 
agreement. 
 In terms of payoffs, not reaching an agreement can be viewed as the 
worst potential outcome for negotiators both individually and at the 
level of the group. The payoff at the individual and the group level 
is zero in this scenario.
 Hypothesis 5:  Not reaching an agreement (no deal) will 
lead to a higher chance of facing negative consequences 
(sanctions). 
 Method 
 In this section, we set out the experiment that we conducted to 
test our hypotheses. First, we explain the setting, experimental 
context, and participants. Next, we describe the design, 
experimental procedure, experimental conditions, and post-test 
questionnaire. 
 Experimental Setting, Context, and Participants 
 The hypotheses were tested in a campus-based, face-to-face 
experiment conducted at a Dutch university. In total, we carried 
out two control sessions and three treatment sessions that were 
administered consecutively. All sessions were carried out on the 
same day and in the same classroom. Graduate and undergraduate 
student subjects were recruited from a course in a public 
administration program. 
40 Public Administration Review • January | February 2018
 The participants were given a negotiation task that enabled us 
to examine the causal effect of accountability on negotiating a 
coalition. Face-to-face negotiation enhances the mundane reality 
for participants in the experiment (Bozeman and Scott  1992 ). A 
classroom setting gives the researcher situational control during the 
experiment (Morton and Williams  2010 ). 
 We asked the participants to negotiate a coalition in triads in a 
game that is best described as a “coalition game” in which utility is 
transferable (Peleg and Sudhölter  2007 ). Forming coalitions while 
weighing individual and group payoffs is central to negotiation 
in both public and private sector settings (Lewicki, Saunders, and 
Barry  2015 ). 
 Rewards 
 The participants were not compensated financially for participation, 
as is customary in experimental economics (Charness and Kuhn 
 2011 ). Rather, the experiment was part of a public administration 
course, and the negotiation was structured such that scores could be 
compared after the experiment ended. The student with the highest 
score was rewarded with a box of chocolates. This reflects that 
we incentivized the participants to perform well on an individual 
level, which could only be achieved by striking a balance between 
individual and group interests. 
 Design 
 A between-subjects design was used. The independent variable 
(accountability) was manipulated to test its effect on the dependent 
variable (negotiation outcomes). We focused on two levels of 
negotiation outcomes. At the group level, we focused on group 
scores and the coalition type that was agreed upon, whereas at the 
individual level, we focused on the individual scores as an indicator 
of negotiator performance. 
 In the control condition, subjects played the coalition game in 
groups of three individuals. In the treatment condition, the subjects 
played the same game in the presence of a randomly matched viewer 
who acted as an accountability forum (see the Procedure section). 
 During the experiment, subjects played a coalition game. The 
players’ task was to form a coalition and divide its value between or 
among its members. Different types of coalitions were worth points 
for the group of subjects. The goal for each player was to obtain the 
highest individual score possible. The negotiation centered around 
the division of points within the coalitions that were formed. In 
other words, the players could decide among each other how they 
would divide the points that a certain coalition was worth. 
 The coalition game is denoted as follows. The value ( v ) of staying 
alone for players A, B, and C is 0. The value of a coalition 
between A and B is 60; between A and C, 40; between B and C, 
70. The grand coalition among all players A, B, and C gives a total 
value of 80. 
 n (A), n (B), n (C) = 0
n (AB) = 60
n (AC) = 40
n (BC) = 70
n (ABC) = 80 
 Our coalition game is a variable-sum game, meaning that the sum of 
all players’ payoffs depends on their employed strategies. Further, the 
game has an infinite amount of solutions for the players (Osborne 
and Rubinstein  1994 , 257; Telser  1994 ). Moreover, the core is 
empty. 1 This means that the solutions formed by the players, known 
as payoff vectors, are inherently unstable (Parkhe  1993 ; Song and 
Panayides  2002 ). For every solution the players agree on, there is 
another agreement that has a higher value ( v ) for at least one player. 
An illustration of this is when the value is evenly divided among the 
players. The “grand coalition” (one-third of  n (ABC) = 26.6) in this 
game results in fewer points for the individual players than the points 
that a coalition between A and B will generate (one-half of  n  (AB) = 
30) (for A and B, that is). Players may also choose to distribute points 
of this coalition differently, but always rounded off to 0.5 point. 
 Also, the players’ positions differ in negotiation power. For this 
reason, the participants are rotated over the players’ positions. 
Theoretically, player B is the strongest, followed by C and then A. 2 
 Our experimental setting is an artificial situation, but it is 
comparable to many negotiations in the public domain. In public 
negotiations, a single optimal solution does not exist because of the 
multitude of interests that vary over time and space (Head  2008 ). 
There are different solutions that will satisfy actors in different 
configurations and require collective action (Van Bueren, Klijn, 
and Koppenjan 2003). Theoretically, players have an incentive to 
negotiate endlessly in this coalition game, as they will never reach 
a stable solution (Telser  1994 ). Mundane deadlines or limited 
resources will then define the end of a negotiation. Think of policy 
targets or the end of a financial year. For the same reason, a time 
limit ends negotiation rounds in this experiment. 
 Procedure 
 A pilot round with six subjects was administered before the final 
experiment took place. The pilot round led to improvement of the 
instructions and of the relationship between the negotiator and 
viewer (forum) by adding green and red cards instead of written 
feedback. 
 During the experiment, randomization was ensured by letting the 
subjects draw from preprinted number cards that corresponded 
to the numbered tables in the room upon entry to the classroom. 
When seated, the participants received an instruction sheet (see 
appendix A in the Supporting Information online), and the 
instructions were read out aloud by the researcher. After the 
students’ questions had been answered, the negotiations began. 
 Following each negotiation round, the subjects had to note 
their individual scores and group scores on paper. In total, the 
participants played this game six times with rematches of players. 
For each of the six rounds, the subjects had five minutes time 
of “play.” During the experiment, a time constraint ended the 
negotiation rounds (see figure  1 ). Finally, the subjects could ask 
questions and were extensively debriefed and informed about the 
purpose of the experiment. 
 Control Condition 
 In the control condition, the subjects played the coalition game 
six times in total (see figure  2 ). After each round, the subjects were 
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assigned a different position (A, B, or C). After three rounds, the 
subjects were regrouped across tables. 
 Treatment Condition 
 In the treatment condition, the subjects were matched in groups of 
three. There were negotiator and viewer roles. All negotiators in this 
condition played the role of negotiator as well as the viewer role. The 
negotiators played the same coalition game, but now every negotiator 
had a viewer (a personal accountability forum) to which he or she 
had to report to. This viewer received 30 percent of the players’ 
(A, B, and C) points, which were not deducted from the players’ 
total. Therefore, the viewer had an interest in giving feedback and 
interfering with the process. The viewers watched the negotiation 
process and were allowed to give feedback at set instances. The 
responsibility for the negotiated outcomes remained with the players. 
All viewers and negotiators were able to see each other. 
 The coalition game was played for two minutes (step I) (see 
figure  3 ). Then, the players had to report to their viewers. The 
viewers were allowed to react on the strategy, earnings, and results 
of their negotiator only (one minute) (step II). Then, A, B, and C 
played for another three minutes (step III). This process was repeated 
six times in total (see figure  1 ). In between, negotiators and viewers 
were rematched over the groups. The subjects were matched in such 
a manner that they could never meet the same player and/or viewer 
for a second time. As in the control condition, the participants were 
randomly assigned to different tables after three rounds. 
 When the negotiation round finished, the viewers had to “pass 
judgment” (Bovens  2007 ) by giving either a green or a red card to 
his or her matched player (after step III). In the case of a green card, 
the player was allowed to keep the earned points. 
 A red card was a penalty for bad negotiation performance in the 
eyes of the viewer. Players who received a red card had to subtract 
two points from their round total. This could add up to a total of 
12 points being subtracted from the players’ total score. 
 Post-Test 
 A paper-based questionnaire was administered after the experiment 
(see appendix B online). This questionnaire contained questions 
on age, gender, and public service motivation (PSM). We included 
these control variables because older individuals may have more 
negotiation experience. Also, the negotiation literature has 
established that men and women negotiate differently, which 
stresses the importance of controlling for gender (Lewicki, Saunders, 
and Barry  2015 ). Additionally, we expect public administration 
students to have high public service motivation and, as a result, high 
motivation to serve the public interest and high compassion levels 
(Vandenabeele  2008 ). 
 Results 
 In total, 87 graduate and undergraduate students were recruited 
from a public administration course, from which 27 served as 
the control and 60 served as the treatment. There were 19 groups 
in total, with 9 groups in the control condition and 10 groups 
in the treatment condition. The results from one group were 
excluded from analysis because of unreadable handwriting and 
 Figure 1  The Order of Events during the Experiment, Control, and Treatment Conditions 
 Figure 2  Negotiating a Coalition in the Control Condition 
 Figure 3  Negotiating a Coalition in the Treatment Condition 
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calculation errors of the participants. All groups negotiated six 
times (for five minutes), which yielded 114 negotiated coalition 
outcomes (54 in the control condition and 60 in the treatment 
condition). 
 Age and gender did not differ between treatment and control. The 
highest level of education differed over the conditions (see table  1 ). 
For this reason, the background variables are used as controls in 
further analyses. The descriptive results confirm that the student 
subjects are good proxies for civil servants because their public 
service motivation is relatively high (Leisink and Steijn  2009 ). The 
10-item Dutch PSM scale had moderate reliability (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .60). 
 A post hoc power test for unequal sample sizes revealed that on the 
basis of the means, the statistical power in this study is .97 ( α = .05, 
df = 17,  N = 10/9,  d = 1.88), which is more than the recommended 
statistical power of .80 (Cohen  1988 ). 
 Accountable Negotiators Will Show Lower Performance at the 
Group Level than Nonaccountable Negotiators 
 The first hypothesis is supported by our data. Triads of players 
in the control condition obtained higher group scores (Mcontrol 
= 464.44, SD = 27.43) than triads in the treatment condition 
(Mtreatment = 374.75, SD = 61.44). Figure  4 shows the average 
total scores of the groups over the entire experiment. The 
development of the scores over time per round can be found in 
appendix C online. 
 As the scores at the group level are not parametric, a Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test is suitable (Siegel and Castellan 1988). The 
differences between control and treatment are statistically 
significant ( w = 83.5,  p = .0017). 
 Group scores, and thus solutions, in the accountability condition 
are more different from each other than they are in the control 
condition. This is confirmed when testing the second hypothesis. 
 The Presence of an Accountability Forum during Negotiations 
Will Lead to Fewer Grand Coalitions 
 The second hypothesis is also supported by the data. The 
negotiators in the accountability condition were less inclined 
to reach a grand coalition (table  2 ). The grand coalition (A, 
B, and C) occurred in 88.9 percent of instances in the control 
condition, whereas it occurred in 36.7 percent in the treatment 
condition. 
 Holding Negotiators Accountable Will Lead to a Higher 
Frequency of Defaults (No Deal) Compared with 
Nonaccountable Players 
 The third hypothesis is also supported by the data. Indeed, 
subjects in the accountability condition show a 6.7 percent rate 
of defaults, whereas the subjects in the control condition always 
reached an agreement (see table  2 ). As players were always able to 
reach an agreement in the control condition, and did not reach an 
agreement in only four cases in the treatment condition, the results 
are statistically significant. Although the absolute numbers are 
small, the point-wise attractiveness of reaching a coalition outcome 
(whichever combination of players) is expected to always generate a 
coalition outcome of some sort. 
 Table 1   Descriptive statistics ( n = 87) 
 % Female  Average Age  Education  PSM 
No accountability (control) 41.4% 21.81 5.76 3.46 
(1.798) (0.812) (0.367) 
 
Accountability (treatment) 25.7% 20.91 5.33 3.32 
(2.485) (0.705) (0.424) 
 
Overall mean 33.3% 21.19 5.46 3.37 
(2.321) (0.759) (0.410) 
Test statistic  χ 2 = 1.510  t -test = 1.903  w = 1040.5  t -test = 1.56 
 p = .219  p = .061  p = .011  p = .123
















 Figure 4  Average Group Scores over the Entire Experiment 
 Table 2   Frequency of Coalitions by Condition 
 No Accountability  Accountability  Test 
 Control  Treatment  Statistic 
AB 1.9% (1) 15.0% (9)  
AC 1.9% (1) 16.7% (10)  
BC 7.4% (4) 25.0% (15)  
ABC 88.9% (48) 36.7% (22)  
No coalition 0.0% (0) 6.7% (4)  
100% (54) 100% (60)  χ  2 = 33.56
 p < .000
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 Lower Individual Scores Lead to More Sanctions by an 
Accountability Forum 
 Analyzing the results for the fourth hypothesis demands that we 
focus on the effects within the accountability condition only. 
Therefore, the results from this part of our analysis are of a 
correlational nature. In total, a red card was given to negotiators in 
30.5 percent of all opportunities to do so by the viewers. 
 Based on the data, we conclude that a lower score predicts a 
sanction at the group level (see table  3 ). Note that the betas 
represent the scores over the length of the experiment (i.e., earning 
90.9 points less resulted in one sanction, or 15.15 fewer points leads 
to a sanction per round on average). The second model adds the 
covariates age, gender, and PSM. The covariates have no effect on 
the relationship between individual scores and sanctions. 
 Additionally, a lagged linear regression was calculated in which the 
sanctions were used as predictor for each round  t + 1. This way, a 
sanction in round one can be used to predict scores in round two, a 
sanction in round two predicts the scores in round three, and so on. In 
our experiment, sanctions in the previous rounds did not significantly 
predict performance,  R 2 = .00,  F (1, 143) = 0.36,  p = .545. There is no 
carryover effect between subsequent negotiations. 
 Not Reaching an Agreement (No Deal) Leads to a Higher 
Chance of Facing Negative Consequences (Sanctions) 
 The fifth hypothesis is not supported by the data. Based on the 
frequency of sanctions, the grand coalition (A, B, and C) led to a 
sanction in 11.3 percent of the cases. In 17.3 percent of cases, a 
dyadic agreement resulted in a sanction for players. Not reaching an 
agreement at all led to a sanction in 33.3 percent of cases. 
 A pooled binomial logistic regression analysis was calculated using 
the coalitions as predictors for sanctions (sanction or no sanction) 
(table  4 ). The grand coalition is used as the reference category 
(most occurring). Not reaching an agreement significantly predicts 
the odds of receiving a sanction (odds ratio = 3.93, 95 percent 
confidence interval, 1.04–14.87,  p = .043). Put differently, not 
reaching an agreement is associated with a 79.7 percentage point 
higher chance of receiving a sanction (compared with reaching an 
agreement). At the same time, reaching a dyadic coalition (AC) is 
significantly associated with a 75.45 percentage point higher chance 
of receiving a sanction. As the AC coalition is also associated with 
sanctions and the model quality is not satisfactory, (i.e., high AIC 
and low pseudo- R 2 ) we decided to reject the fifth hypothesis. 
 Discussion 
 Many New Public Management public sector reforms hinge on the 
idea that public accountability increases public performance (Bovens, 
Schillemans, and ’t Hart 2008). Dubnick ( 2005 ) notes that empirical 
tests of the link between public accountability and performance 
are scarce. Moreover, decisions are increasingly taken by means 
of negotiation in governance networks, while public accountability 
structures have not adapted to these newer forms of decision making. 
 Our experiment consistently shows that public accountability leads 
to different coalitions and more no-deals. The group-level payoffs 
seem to be prioritized when negotiators are not held accountable. 
Conversely, when negotiators are held accountable, individual 
payoffs seem to be prioritized. Although the data do not allow us 
to make causal claims on the sanction part of the experiment, the 
results suggest that sanctions have a small or no effect on subsequent 
 Table 3   OLS Predicting Sanctions under the Effect of Accountability 
 Model I  Model II  Model III 
Constant 1.174*** 0.585 1.168 
(0.199) (0.943) (1.381) 
Score –0.011*** –0.011*** –0.011*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age 0.015 –0.012 
(0.032) (0.054) 
Male –0.162 –0.185 
(0.186) (0.193) 
PSM 0.115 0.137 
(0.188) (0.195) 
Education (secondary school) –0.119 
(0.628) 
Education (applied university) 0.018 
(0.706) 
Education (college-level BA/MA) 0.165 
(0.689) 
 N 53 53 53 
 R 2 0.215 0.237 0.250 
Adjusted  R 2 0.200 0.173 0.133 
Residual SE 0.572 0.581 0.595 
(df = 51) (df = 48) (df = 45) 
 F -statistic 14.007*** 3.726** 2.142* 
(df = 1; 51) (df = 4; 48) (df = 7; 45) 
AIC 95.09 99.62 104.71 
 Durbin-Watson 
 (1 > criterion < 3) 
1.81 1.83 1.84
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses. No VIF values < 10 and average close to 1, 
Cooks- d , all < .4, normality of errors, and heteroscedasticity met. 
 ***  p < .01; **  p < .05; *  p < .1. 
 Table 4   (Binomial Logistic Regression) Predicting Sanctions from Coalition Type 
 Model I  Model II  Model III 
Constant –2.061*** –2.906 –5.091 
(0.401) (2.546) (3.803) 
No coalition 1.368** 1.324* 1.237* 
(0.679) (0.687) (0.700) 
AB –0.241 –0.331 –0.391 
(0.843) (0.853) (0.857) 
AC 1.123** 1.004* 1.031* 
(0.562) (0.574) (0.590) 
BC 0.174 0.062 0.154 
(0.626) (0.634) (0.645) 
Age –0.035 0.104 
(0.090) (0.156) 
Male 0.616 0.629 
(0.545) (0.550) 
PSM 0.353 0.307 
(0.510) (0.522) 
Education (secondary school) –0.377 
(1.315) 
Education (applied university) –0.943 
(1.642) 
Education (college level BA/MA) –2.335 
(1.790) 
 N 169 169 169 
Log-likelihood –71.916 –70.964 –69.314 
AIC 153.832 157.929 160.629 
Hosmer and Lemeshow  R 2 0.052 0.056 0.086 
Cox and Snell  R2 0.046 0.056 0.075 
Nagelkerke  R 2 0.077 0.095 0.126 
% correct predicted 28.1 28.2 28.5
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 ***  p < .01; **  p < .05; *  p < .1. 
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negotiations. Our findings have implications for public accountability 
as well as for coalition negotiations in the public sector. 
 Public Accountability 
 Our main finding is that group-level performance of negotiators 
is reduced by public accountability. In our experiment, individual 
negotiators were held accountable for their actions. A question 
remains whether performance of organizations instead of individual 
negotiators would also be lowered by public accountability. 
This question is relevant as individual negotiators may be held 
accountable by their superiors, while the organization they represent 
will be held accountable by a political forum or citizens. 
 In our experiment, the viewers were instructed to rate their 
negotiators. If the goal of public accountability is to increase 
performance, the accountability structure may need to focus more 
on process rather than output. Similarly, if including all actors 
in a coalition is a goal, viewers may need more precise process 
benchmarks instead of just rating their negotiators. 
 Although our negotiation setting is a low-stakes game for the 
players, the viewers indeed sanctioned poor performers, while 
those sanctions as such seem to have had no effect at all on the 
future negotiations of the sanctioned. Although these findings 
are preliminary, they imply that accountability forums do indeed 
sanction poor performance, but the sanctions do not impact the 
future behavior of organizations. Additionally, the worst-performing 
negotiators are not sanctioned hard. Implying compassion for the 
negotiator or social reciprocity between actor and forum. 
 Public Negotiations 
 Public organizations are increasingly held accountable by citizens. In 
our experiment, negotiators seem to focus on including all players as 
much as possible. As negotiators knew beforehand that they would 
negotiate in multiple rounds, the focus on the group could be a 
result of  forward induction . This does not offer an explanation for the 
higher number of no-deals when negotiators are held accountable. 
Our findings also provide some support for the idea that negotiations 
behind closed doors may result in better group outcomes than 
negotiations that are subject to public accountability (Chambers  2004 ). 
 Also, it seems that a focus on accountability of the output reduces 
the attention of negotiators to the results at the group level. 
Negotiation results in the public sector are frequently about the 
group level or even about generating a public good. 
 For practitioners, there are a number of relevant takeaways. Negotiators 
should pay specific attention to payoffs of parties at the group  and 
individual levels when parties are expected to be held accountable. 
Practitioners should expect that negotiators are more likely to form 
smaller coalitions. The consequences of public accountability—such as 
sanctions—have little effect on future negotiations. 
 Limitations 
 Finally, we discuss some limitations and avenues for further research 
before final conclusions can be drawn from our study. 
 A first limitation is that we employed student subjects in our 
experiment. This raises the question of whether public servants 
who negotiate a coalition would respond in a similar fashion. 
The use of student-based samples in experimental research has 
been criticized because of limited statistical generalizability (for 
an overview, see Charness and Kuhn  2011 ; Morton and Williams 
 2010 ). Psychologists and behavioral economists are struggling with 
the question of when and how using students in experiments is 
appropriate (Charness and Kuhn  2011 ; Druckman and Kam  2011 ; 
Open Science Collaboration  2015 ). In public administration, 
there is no real consensus on this matter, but a substantial share of 
experimental studies in public administration make use of student 
participants (Bouwman and Grimmelikhuijsen  2016 ; Li and Van 
Ryzin  2017 ). Our study focuses on the behavior of individuals 
in negotiations and groups of individuals at the psychological 
micro level of aggregation (Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2016; Meier 
and Funk  2017 ; Tepe and Prokop  2017 ). Using students creates 
a problem especially when “the treatment effect is moderated and 
the moderating variable varies between students and nonstudent 
samples” (Druckman and Kam  2011 , 51; Tepe and Prokop  2017 ). 
Also, distinctive characteristics of students, such as relatively low 
age and higher education, compared with practitioners, could have 
influenced our findings. 
 Second, a face-to-face negotiation is more realistic to subjects 
compared with computerized laboratory negotiation settings and 
therefore has higher ecological validity, but it does introduce the 
risk of exogenous (confounding) influences, such as social effects 
of liking or body language of the participants. The participants in 
our experiment could see each other and possibly knew each other 
beforehand. Despite randomization, some familiarity with one 
another might have biased the results. Additionally, experimenter 
demand effects may have influenced the findings. This is a trade-
off between mundane realism (Bozeman and Scott  1992 ), on 
the one hand, and experimental control, on the other hand. The 
choice for a face-to-face experiment is partly legitimized by the 
fact that negotiations are most often a face-to-face activity and 
that negotiators and an accountability forum may also know each 
other. 
 Third, in our study, negotiators and viewers switched roles for 
practical reasons, while in the public domain, the role of viewer and 
negotiator will be more stable over time. More research is needed 
to study the repeated and asymmetric character of the relation 
between actor and forum, in which for example building trust or 
familiarity could play a moderating role. Also, the viewer in our 
study obtained 30 percent of payoffs of the negotiators. Varying on 
this strength, that is, setting the payoff for the viewer at 10 percent 
or 60 percent, might provide insight into how the relationship 
between forum and negotiator works. Unfortunately, our data 
do not enable us to answer to what extent individual negotiator 
payoffs under public accountability pressure are conditional on the 
group results. 
 Replication 
 Future research efforts should be aimed at replicating this study in 
different settings by using different types of experimental designs 
such as a computerized experiment that strips off more context 
for higher internal validity. Alternatively, a field experiment with 
practitioners that focuses on the link between public accountability 
and negotiator or organizational performance seems like a good 
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step forward to see how our findings travel to more context-rich 
environments. 
 Public and Private Sector Negotiations 
 Another promising way forward would be to study differences 
between public sector and private sector negotiators in their 
responses to accountability. Accountability in the public sector is 
more stringent compared with the private sector, especially with 
regard to processes and general policy (Mulgan  2000 ). Moreover, 
public and private sector employees seem to differ consistently in 
some personality characteristics such as compassion, self-sacrifice, 
altruism, and risk perceptions (Perry and Wise  1990 ; Vandenabeele 
 2007 ; Wildavsky and Dake  1990 ). The differences in specific 
characteristics may play an important role in negotiations as well. 
 Conclusion 
 Our study makes two important contributions to the literature. 
First, this article brings together accountability and negotiation 
literature in the public domain, which has not been done before to 
our knowledge. 3 
 Second, accountability scholars have suggested to use experiments 
to test the impact of accountability on public sector organizations 
and employees (Koch and Wüstemann  2014 ). By using a face-to-
face negotiation experiment, we balanced high internal validity 
of the study and reasonable reality for the participants. While 
acknowledging that further refinements are necessary, we have 
made an important first step in studying effects of accountability on 
public negotiators by means of an experimental design. 
 In line with earlier studies on negotiations, we found that public 
accountability leads to lower performance in negotiations at the 
group level (see table  5 ) (Klimoski  1972 ; O’Connor  1997 ). This is 
an important finding, as negotiating in a coalition differs in many 
respects from simpler dyadic bargaining settings that are often used 
in experiments (Lewicky, Saunders, and Barry 2015; Murninghan 
 1986 ; Stevenson, Pearce and Porter  1986 ). 
 Next to lower performance, the frequency in which negotiators 
reached a grand coalition was reduced under the influence of 
accountability in our experiment. Recent research has found that civil 
servants and public administration students are relatively cooperative 
in a range of settings (Esteve, Van Witteloostuijn, and Boyne 2015). 
This may partly explain the high number of grand coalitions in the 
control condition. Within the accountability treatment, our finding 
seems to suggest that negotiators opt for higher individual payoffs at 
the cost of cooperation with all negotiators. 
 Further, accountability led negotiators to not reach any agreement 
at all. When an agreement was reached, it appears that negotiators 
focused on smaller coalitions and higher individual results instead 
of group results. This finding is particularly interesting because the 
size of the sanctions in our experiment was limited in size and the 
experimental game was a low-stakes setting. One should interpret 
this finding with caution: time pressure in general seems to produce 
nonagreements in negotiations (Carnevale and Lawler  1986 ; 
Mosterd and Rutte  2000 ). 
 When focusing on only the treatment condition and using cross-
sectional data, we found that poorer performing negotiators received 
more sanctions from their accountability forum. Also, sanctions did 
not improve performance in subsequent negotiation rounds. 
 Accountability is claimed to reduce corruption and increase trust 
and performance. We contribute to the inconclusive theoretical 
discussion on the effect of accountability in the public sector by 
providing empirical evidence that public accountability leads to 
different coalitions and lower group outcomes in negotiations. Our 
findings underscore that the adverse effects of public accountability 
on individual and group outcomes as well as organizational 
performance should not be overlooked. 
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 Notes 
 1. Proof that the core is empty (e.g., Raiffa, Richardson, and Metcalfe  2002 ): 
 XA + XB ≥ n (AB) = 60 
 XA + XC ≥ n (AC) = 40 
 XB + XC ≥ n (BC) = 70 
 2XA + 2XB + 2XC ≥ 170 
 XA + XB ≥ XC ≥ 85 
 (Core is empty because  85 ≥  X  A  +  X  B  +  X  C  = 80 ).
 2. Shapley values indicate the bargaining power of the players (Raiffa, Richardson, 
and Metcalfe  2002 ). Shapley values for players: A = 20, B = 35, C = 25. 
 3. Some international relations studies focus on the related concept of transparency 
and negotiations (e.g., Stasavage  2004 ). 
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